Saturday, March 15, 2008
Oil: Why So High?
That brings us to speculation. Evans observes that since September 2003, the total number of open crude oil futures and options contracts rose by 364 percent. Meanwhile the global demand for petroleum rose by just 8.2 percent. "So the futures and options market has become more important than the physical supplies in driving the price," concludes Evans. "We are seeing investment flows into the oil market that don't have anything to do with the demand and supply of oil."
Investors are treating oil as a hedge against inflation and a falling dollar. Oil markets are part of a
negativepositive feedback loop in which higher oil prices contribute to higher inflation, which in turn lowers the value of the dollar, which boosts oil prices, and so forth. In other words, the oil market is coming to resemble the gold market (which has also been soaring). Evans notes that most gold traders don't even ask the question of how much gold was mined last year or how much spare gold mining capacity there is.
No one is predicting $10 per barrel oil. However, once the current bubble bursts, both Evans and Lynch believe that the price of crude will settle at around $60 to $70 per barrel in the next couple of years. "It's very hard to pinpoint just how long a bubble can expand before it breaks. Getting the timing right is not an easy matter," says Evans. But he adds, "I think that this is the riskiest time to be long in crude oil since 1980."
Monday, March 10, 2008
The Hugo Dems
Even as Mr. Chávez was doing his war dance, Senate Finance Chairman Max Baucus was warning the White House not to send the Colombia deal to the Hill for a vote without the permission of Democratic leaders. He was seconded by Ways and Means Chairman Charlie Rangel, who told Congress Daily that "they don't have the votes for it, it's not going to come on the floor," adding that "what they [the White House] don't understand it's not the facts on the ground, it's the politics that's in the air."
Mr. Rangel is right about the politics. No matter what U.S. strategic interests may be in Colombia, this is an election year in America. And Democrats don't want to upset their union and anti-trade allies. The problem is that the time available to pass anything this year is growing short. The closer the election gets, the more leverage protectionists have to run out the clock on the Bush Presidency. The deal has the support of a bipartisan majority in the Senate, and probably also in the House. Sooner or later the White House will have to force the issue.
These are the same Democrats who preach the virtues of "soft power" and diplomacy, while deriding Mr. Bush for being too quick to use military force. But trade is a classic form of soft power that would expand U.S. and Latin ties in a web of commercial interests. More than 8,000 U.S. companies currently export to Colombia, nearly 85% of which are small and medium-sized firms. Colombia is already the largest South American market for U.S. farm products, and the pact would open Colombia to new competition and entrepreneurship.
Which brings us back to Mr. Chávez and his many Democratic friends. Connecticut Senator Chris Dodd's early support helped the strongman consolidate his power. Former President Jimmy Carter blessed Mr. Chávez's August 2004 recall victory, despite evidence of fraud. And then there are the many House Democrats, current and former, who have accepted discount oil from Venezuela and then distributed it in the U.S. to boost their own political fortunes. Joseph P. Kennedy II and Massachusetts Congressman Bill Delahunt have been especially cozy with Venezuela's oil company. If Democrats spurn free trade with Colombia, these Democratic ties with Mr. Chávez will deserve more political scrutiny.
Senators Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama are both competing for union support. But if they wanted to demonstrate their own Presidential qualities, they'd be privately telling Ms. Pelosi to pass the Colombia pact while Mr. Bush is still in office. That would spare either one of them from having to spend political capital to pass it next year.Instead, both say they oppose the deal on grounds that Mr. Uribe has not done more to protect "trade unionists." In fact, Mr. Uribe has done more to reduce violence in Colombia than any modern leader in Bogotá. The real question for Democrats is
whether they're going to choose Colombia -- or Hugo Chávez.
Labels: Alvaro Uribe, Chris Dodd, Colombia, Free Trade, Hillary Clinton, Hugo, Nancy Pelosi, Obama, Venezuela, William Delahunt
Sunday, March 09, 2008
NYT's Mac Attack Continues
Labels: John McCain, NYT Bias
Saturday, March 08, 2008
Uribe, Chavez & Correa Hold Hands and Sing Kumbaya
Labels: Alvaro Uribe, Correa, Hugo
Bad News for the Next Prez
What I always wondered was Amb. Crocker's relation to '80's neo-con bete noire Chester Crocker.
Labels: General Petraeus, Iraq, Ryan Crocker
NYTimes Goes After McCain
Labels: John McCain, NYT Bias
Kaplan's Kolkata and Kaplan's Colombia
CSM pronounced The Atlantic's daily post The Current as one of its "Monitor Picks." This is what they said:
Struggling to find time to wade through a 5,000-word essay on global affairs? Go the easier route, and check out The Current, where Atlantic scribes offer their pithy takes on timely topics.Kaplan was a recent contributer with his take on Colombia and Alvaro Uribe which I consider spot on:
Venezuelan megalomaniac Hugo Chavez's dispatch of troops to the Colombian border is meant not just as an affront to the Colombians but to Colombia's ally, the United States. Chavez must have deep sense of inferiority, because Colombian President Alvaro Uribe Velez is everything Chavez is not. Indeed, handicapped for size and importance of the country, Colombian President Uribe is the most impressive and successful ruler in the democratic world. A quiet, workaholic, he is the opposite of a demagogue. If Pakistan or Iraq had an Uribe, they would both be increasingly out-of-the-news success stories.
Labels: Alvaro Uribe, Calcutta, Colombia, Hugo, India, Robert Kaplan, The Atlantic, The Current, Venezuela
Anthony Lewis on Cuban Libraries
Labels: ALA, Cuban Libraries, Nat Hentoff
No Longer Obama's Problem From Hell
Labels: "Israel Lobby", Obama, Samantha Power
Friday, March 07, 2008
Correa Knew About Reyes Being In Ecuador
Labels: Boz, Colombia, Correa, Ecuador, FARC
Dealing With Iran & There's No Escaping Chuck Hagel
As a solution to the nuclear dispute, the US and its allies should propose turning Iran's national enrichment efforts into a multinational program. Under this approach, the Iranian government would agree to allow two or more additional governments (for example, France and Germany) to participate in the management and operation of those activities within Iran. In exchange, Iran would be able to jointly own and operate an enrichment facility without facing international sanctions. Resolving the nuclear issue would, in turn, make it possible for Iran to enjoy a variety of other benefits such as membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), increased trade with Europe, access to badly needed equipment for its aviation and energy industries, and perhaps normalized relations with the United States.
Such an arrangement could take many different forms, but any version of it would likely be subject to the following conditions:
- Iran would be prohibited from producing either highly enriched uranium or reprocessed plutonium. This is the most important principle in the proposal. If Iran cannot produce or acquire highly enriched uranium, it cannot build a nuclear weapon. If Iran's enrichment program is turned into a multilateral project, it makes it extremely difficult for Iran to produce highly enriched uranium. Any attempt to do so, even secretly, would carry the risk of discovery by the international management team and the staff at the facility; the high probability of getting caught will likely deter Iran from trying to do so in the first place.
- No work on nuclear fuel, including research and development, could be conducted in Iran outside the multilateral arrangement. In addition, no institution, personnel, or facility associated with the Iranian military would be allowed to participate in the production of nuclear fuel or other nuclear activities. Neither of the two kinds of materials used to make a weapon—highly enriched uranium and reprocessed plutonium—would be produced, only uranium enriched to low levels that could be used in nuclear power plants.
- Iran would fully implement the Additional Protocol of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which requires member nations to make their nuclear facilities subject to snap inspections, environmental sampling, and more comprehensive reporting requirements. Iran has already offered to go beyond the current safeguards of nuclear processes it adheres to, and it should be held to that offer. Inherent in any multilateral arrangement for Iran's nuclear program is a requirement for greater transparency, since Iran's foreign partners will need full access to records and personnel to carry out their management responsibilities.
- Iran would commit itself to a program only of light water reactors (LWRs), which require uranium fuel enriched only to low levels and which, compared with other types of reactors, produce relatively small amounts of plutonium in the nuclear waste generated. This is a reasonable demand since the LWR is the de facto international standard.
For all its potential benefits, an attempt to bring Iran's nuclear program under multilateral control also carries risks. It raises a large and complex set of financial, legal, and technical issues. How can a multilateral scheme be reconciled with existing UN sanctions resolutions and national sanctions laws? How would the multinational "owners" and their management team decide policy and resolve internal disagreements?
These are not trivial issues. Still, the main objection to the multilateral approach has
traditionally been that it increases the risk of proliferation. According to this argument, Iran's capacities to build nuclear weapons could improve under a multilateral arrangement because of (a) the transfer of technical knowledge to Iranian managers and workers; (b) the potential diversion of nuclear materials or technology from the multilateral facility to a clandestine, parallel program; and (c) the possibility that Iran could cancel the program by renationalizing it and expelling the multilateral partners.
On the first issue, it seems fair to assume that Iranian technicians would, in fact, obtain technical knowledge that they did not previously possess by working with their international colleagues. What they would learn, whether the acquired knowledge would prove decisive, or whether they would have learned it on their own anyway is unclear.
On the second issue, diversion of material or technology to a clandestine program, it
is worth remembering that even with routine safeguards, diversion is extremely difficult. In practice, the IAEA has been very good at accounting for nuclear material, and Iran would have to be willing to take a large risk of detection to engage in diversion. Given the enhanced transparency of a multilateral arrangement and the constant presence in Iran of foreign monitors that such a plan would require, the risk of detection would be even higher. Indeed, experience during the nuclear age strongly suggests that governments are less likely to attempt diversion or to defeat safeguards when there is an active verification effort within a country. (In general, proliferators prefer to wait until the inspectors have gone home.)
The third concern, cancellation of a multilateral program, is possible but would doubtless prove extremely costly to Iran. Iran could not jettison the program without risking a possible military response and other punishments from the US and its international partners.
Labels: Chuck Hagel, Iran, Jim Walsh, Nukes, Thomas Pickering, William Luers
Monday, March 03, 2008
Hugo the FARC Lover
"You'll see a lot of [diplomatic] movement in the next few days,'' Frechette said, adding, "Chávez is playing to the cheap seats in Venezuela. His ratings are down. The economy is suffering, and the people know it. He's using this as a smoke screen. Note that Chávez has carefully not said he'll attack Colombia"
Every piece even the one at NYTimes notes Chavez is gets along fine with the FARC. NYTimes article defined Chavez/FARC relations as warm and noted, just like WaPost, that Reyes and Hugo had met three times."Uribe has got to go down there, meet with Correa, calm him down, and he's going to have Chávez fuming at the border," Frechette said. Uribe is "in a pickle, in the sense that diplomatically he's got to get himself out of this corner that he's got himself in."
Labels: Colombia, Correa, Ecuador, FARC, Hugo, Raul Reyes, Uribe, Venezuela
Sunday, March 02, 2008
Surging Backlash
Has it allowed us to reduce troop levels to below where they were when it started? The answer is no.Kinsley expands on his simple one word answer:
In fact, President Bush laid down the standard of success when he announced the surge more than a year ago: "If we increase our support at this crucial moment, and help the Iraqis break the current cycle of violence, we can hasten the day our troops begin coming home." At the time, there were about 130,000 American soldiers in Iraq. Bush proposed to add up to 20,000 more troops. Although Bush never made any official promises about a timetable, the surge was generally described as lasting six to eight months.
By last summer, the surge had actually added closer to 30,000 troops, making the total American troop count about 160,000. Today, there are still more than 150,000 American troops in Iraq. The official plan has been to get that number back down to 130,000 by July and then to keep going so that there would be about 100,000 American troops in Iraq by the time Bush leaves office. Lately, though, Gen. Petraeus has come up with another zenlike idea: He calls it a "pause." And the administration has signed on, meaning that the total number of American troops in Iraq will remain at 130,000 for an undetermined period.
So, the best that we can hope for, in terms of American troops risking their lives in Iraq, is that there will be just as many next July—and probably next January, when time runs out—as there were a year ago. The surge will have surged in and surged out, leaving us back where we started. Maybe the situation in Baghdad, or the whole country, will have improved. But apparently it won't have improved enough to risk an actual reduction in the American troop commitment.
Nir Rosen is even less impressed with the so called surge, placing the success on our efforts to bribe Sunni militants:
Having lost the civil war, many Sunnis were suddenly desperate to switch sides -- and Gen. David Petraeus was eager to oblige. The U.S. has not only added 30,000 more troops in Iraq -- it has essentially bribed the opposition, arming the very Sunni militants who only months ago were waging deadly assaults on American forces. To engineer a fragile peace, the U.S. military has created and backed dozens of new Sunni militias, which now operate beyond the control of Iraq's central government. The Americans call the units by a variety of euphemisms: Iraqi Security Volunteers (ISVs), neighborhood watch groups, Concerned Local Citizens, Critical Infrastructure Security. The militias prefer a simpler and more dramatic name: They call themselves Sahwa, or "the Awakening."At least 80,000 men across Iraq are now employed by the Americans as ISVs. Nearly all are Sunnis, with the exception of a few thousand Shiites. Operating as a contractor, Osama runs 300 of these new militiamen, former resistance fighters whom the U.S. now counts as allies because they are cashing our checks. The Americans pay Osama once a month; he in turn provides his men with uniforms and pays them ten dollars a day to man checkpoints in the Dora district -- a paltry sum even by Iraqi standards. A former contractor for KBR, Osama is now running an armed network on behalf of the United States government. "We use our own guns," he tells me, expressing regret that his units have not been able to obtain the heavy-caliber machine guns brandished by other Sunni militias.
The American forces responsible for overseeing "volunteer" militias like Osama's have no illusions about their loyalty. "The only reason anything works or anybody deals with us is because we give them money," says a young Army intelligence officer. The 2nd Squadron, 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment, which patrols Osama's territory, is handing out $32 million to Iraqis in the district, including $6 million to build the towering walls that, in the words of one U.S. officer, serve only to "make Iraqis more divided than they already are." In districts like Dora, the strategy of the surge seems simple: to buy off every Iraqi in sight. All told, the U.S. is now backing more than 600,000 Iraqi men in the security sector -- more than half the number Saddam had at the height of his power. With the ISVs in place, the Americans are now arming both sides in the civil war. "Iraqi solutions for Iraqi problems," as U.S. strategists like to say. David Kilcullen, the counterinsurgency adviser to Gen. Petraeus, calls it "balancing competing armed interest groups."
Labels: Iraq, John McCain, Michael Kinsley, Nir Rosen, Surge
Chavez Exposed
The literacy scheme was one of a clutch of social “missions” organised by Mr Chávez in 2003, when he faced possible defeat in a recall referendum on his presidency. The government claims that by October 2005 it had all but eliminated illiteracy. That claim has become a centrepiece of the international propaganda effort on behalf of Mr Chávez's “revolution”. But there is no data to support it. Many educationalists doubt it. Even the government itself has retreated from its initial figure of “less than 1% illiteracy” to a figure of around 4%, though it is not clear whether this refers just to adults or to the total population.
It is notoriously difficult to obtain precise literacy figures from census data, which rely on self-assessment. But Francisco Rodríguez of Wesleyan University in Connecticut and Daniel Ortega of IESA, a Caracas business school, have used household surveys from the national statistical institute to assess the programme. In an article in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs, Mr Rodríguez says that they found “little evidence” of any “statistically distinguishable effect on Venezuelan illiteracy”. Where the government says it taught 1.5m, the study found that only 1.1m were illiterate to begin with, and that the fall over the 2003-05 period was less than 100,000. Even this improvement could largely be explained by a long-term demographic trend (many illiterate adults are elderly and die off).
Adán Chávez, who is the education minister as well as the president's brother, has complained of statistical “manipulation” by the government's foes. But Mr Rodríguez, for one, is no reactionary; he was the chief economist of Venezuela's National Assembly in 2000-04, and was once a chavista sympathiser.
Last year the statistics institute launched its own study on the impact of the social missions. This was supposed to be ready by January. But delays in buying equipment mean it has yet to start, according to Irene Gurrea, the economist in charge. Asked if there were any reliable statistics on the impact of Misión Robinson, Ms Gurrea said: “As far as we know, no—that's why we're doing the study.”
Staff of an older literacy programme run by Fe y Alegría, a Catholic charity, say they continue to enroll students. In Machiques, near the Colombian border, 100 joined in the past semester. They say that up to 40% of the Warao Indians in the Orinoco delta are illiterate. In 2005 Mr Chávez told local officials to declare their towns officially “illiteracy free”. Knowing this to be untrue, the mayor of Machiques resisted, but gave in to pressure, according to Jesús Vilorio, who works for Fe y Alegría.
It is not hard to find individuals like Ms Silva who say their lives were changed by Misión Robinson. But the missions have gone hand-in-hand with neglect of schools and hospitals. Mr Rodríguez estimates that Robinson spent $1,000 for each of its literate graduates, compared with around $60 for other literacy schemes in Latin America. At the least, that money could have been better spent.
Soon after joining the National Assembly, I clashed with the administration over underfunding of the Consolidated Social Fund (known by its Spanish acronym FUS), which had been created by Chávez to coordinate the distribution of resources to antipoverty programs. The law establishing the fund included a special provision to ensure that it would benefit from rising oil revenues. But when oil revenues started to go up, the Finance Ministry ignored the provision, allocating to the fund in the 2001 budget only $295 million -- 15 percent less than the previous year and less than a third of the legally mandated $1.1 billion. When my office pointed out this inconsistency, the Finance Ministry came up with the creative accounting gimmick of rearranging the law so that programs not coordinated by the FUS would nevertheless appear to be receiving resources from it. The effect was to direct resources away from the poor even as oil profits were surging. (Hard-liners in the government, incensed by my office's criticisms, immediately called for my ouster. When the last moderates, who understood the need for an independent research team to evaluate policies, left the Chávez camp in 2004, the government finally disbanded our office.)Rodriguez notes that income inequality has actually increased during Hugo's tenure:
One would expect such a consensus to be backed up by an impressive array of evidence. But in fact, there is remarkably little data supporting the claim that the Chávez administration has acted any differently from previous Venezuelan governments -- or, for that matter, from those of other developing and Latin American nations -- in redistributing the gains from economic growth to the poor. One oft-cited statistic is the decline in poverty from a peak of 54 percent at the height of the national strike in 2003 to 27.5 percent in the first half of 2007. Although this decline may appear impressive, it is also known that poverty reduction is strongly associated with economic growth and that Venezuela's per capita GDP grew by nearly 50 percent during the same time period -- thanks in great part to a tripling of oil prices. The real question is thus not whether poverty has fallen but whether the Chávez government has been particularly effective at converting this period of economic growth into poverty reduction. One way to evaluate this is by calculating the reduction in poverty for every percentage point increase in per capita income -- in economists' lingo, the income elasticity of poverty reduction. This calculation shows an average reduction of one percentage point in poverty for every percentage point in per capita GDP growth during this recovery, a ratio that compares unfavorably with those of many other developing countries, for which studies tend to put the figure at around two percentage points. Similarly, one would expect pro-poor growth to be accompanied by a marked decrease in income inequality. But according to the Venezuelan Central Bank, inequality has actually increased during the Chávez administration, with the Gini coefficient (a measure of economic inequality, with zero indicating perfect equality and one indicating perfect inequality) increasing from 0.44 to 0.48 between 2000 and 2005.In fact by almost every measure things have managed to get worse for many Venezuelans:
...official statistics show no signs of a substantial improvement in the well-being of ordinary Venezuelans, and in many cases there have been worrying deteriorations. The percentage of underweight babies, for example, increased from 8.4 percent to 9.1 percent between 1999 and 2006. During the same period, the percentage of households without access to running water rose from 7.2 percent to 9.4 percent, and the percentage of families living in dwellings with earthen floors multiplied almost threefold, from 2.5 percent to 6.8 percent.How about that largesse being diverted to the poor? Non-existent says Rodriguez, although he eschews raw numbers and goes by percentage of the budget:
Remarkably, given Chávez's rhetoric and reputation, official figures show no significant change in the priority given to social spending during his administration. The average share of the budget devoted to health, education, and housing under Chávez in his first eight years in office was 25.12 percent, essentially identical to the average share (25.08 percent) in the previous eight years. And it is lower today than it was in 1992, the last year in office of the "neoliberal" administration of Carlos Andrés Pérez -- the leader whom Chávez, then a lieutenant colonel in the Venezuelan army, tried to overthrow in a coup, purportedly on behalf of Venezuela's neglected poor majority.Health stats are also quite bleek:
In a number of recent studies, I have worked with colleagues to look more systematically at the results of Chávez's health and education misiones. Our findings confirm that Chávez has in fact done little for the poor. For example, his government often claims that the influx of Cuban doctors under the Barrio Adentro health program is responsible for a decline in infant mortality in Venezuela. In fact, a careful analysis of trends in infant and neonatal mortality shows that the rate of decline is not significantly different from that of the pre-Chávez period, nor from the rate of decline in other Latin American countries. Since 1999, the infant mortality rate in Venezuela has declined at an annual rate of 3.4 percent, essentially identical to the 3.3 percent rate at which it had declined during the previous nine-year period and lower than the rates of decline for the same period in Argentina (5.5 percent), Chile (5.3 percent), and Mexico (5.2 percent).Bills are coming due:
But by late 2007, Chávez's economic model had begun to unravel. For the first time since early 2004, a majority of voters claimed that both their personal situation and the country's situation had worsened during the preceding year. Scarcities in basic foodstuffs, such as milk, black beans, and sardines, were chronic, and the difference between the official and the black-market exchange rate reached 215 percent. When the Central Bank board received its November price report indicating that monthly inflation had risen to 4.4 percent (equivalent to an annual rate of 67.7 percent), it decided to delay publication of the report until after the vote on the constitutional reform was held.
This growing economic crisis is the predictable result of the gross mismanagement of the economy by Chávez's economic team. During the past five years, the Venezuelan government has pursued strongly expansionary fiscal and economic policies, increasing real spending by 137 percent and real liquidity by 218 percent. This splurge has outstripped even the expansion in oil revenues: the Chávez administration has managed the admirable feat of running a budget deficit in the midst of an oil boom.
A sensible solution to Venezuela's overexpansion would require reining in spending and the growth of the money supply. But such a solution is anathema to Chávez, who has repeatedly equated any call for spending reductions with neoliberal dogma. Instead, the government has tried to deal with inflation by expanding the supply of foreign currency to domestic firms and consumers and increasing government subsidies. The result is a highly distorted economy in which the government effectively subsidizes two-thirds of the cost of imports and foreign travel for the wealthy while the poor cannot find basic food items on store shelves. The astounding growth of imports, which have nearly tripled since 2002 (imports of such luxury items as Hummers and 15-year-old Scotch have grown even more dramatically), is now threatening to erase the nation's current account surplus.
Labels: Empty Revolution, Francisco Rodriguez, Hugo, Venezuela
Bushies Pining for Paraguay? Lugo Paraguay's Hugo?
I should also note that Paraguay and it's undefeated ruling party, Colorado, is the topic of a great piece on OpenDemocracy. Hugo wannabe Lugo is apparently set to end the Colorado winning streak.
Labels: Colorado Party, Lugo, Moonies, Neil Bush, Paraguay
Obama and Other Hagel Loving Dems
There is an interview with Hagel in the latest issue of The American Interest (sub. required). At one point he sounds rather Obama-ish, although he actually means it while Obama, the most leftist member of the Senate (take that Ted!), seems to only pay lip service to the end of partisanship:
AI: With 11 years gone and one more to go in the Senate, how do you think back on your time here? Some say you’ve moved from many standard conservative positions to more centrist ones. You think that’s a fair description?
Senator Hagel: It is, and part of it has to do with what I’ve learned about the complexity of most of the issues we face as a society. We’re rarely confronted with easy calls, with a clearly “right” and a clearly “wrong” side. Life generally is not that way. But some people, from both parties, like to live in a world of absolutes, and that has polarized politics and strangled any bipartisan progress. People won’t work toward any kind of compromise when they feel they’re giving up their values, standards and beliefs. It has become clear to me, over the course of my 11 years working in this sausage factory here, that without any consensus on how to behave in order to move our country forward, we’re essentially paralyzed. I’ve moved toward the middle because that’s where I think the effective solutions are.
I’ve also learned to better appreciate the importance of personal relationships in how things work here. I’ve seen this President of the United States establish virtually no personal relationships, and it has cost the country. His position has been, “It’s either my way or the highway, because I’m the Decider.” But when you don’t have the lubricant of personal relationships in a democratic government—any form of government, really, but especially a two-party democracy—the gears will lock up, and the system will break down. That’s what has happened, and both sides are to blame.
It’s a very distressing dynamic, but I think the next president will understand that and act on that. Better personal relationships will form, and we’ll see a bipartisan cabinet, among other changes. It’s not a matter of choice, because the challenges facing this country are so immense that we can’t afford another four years of paralysis.
Labels: Chris Dodd, Chuck Hagel, John McCain, Obama
Messing Up the Andes and LA
Council of Foreign Relations has an excellent Daily Analysis on the Dem hatred for NAFTA along with some helpful links.
Labels: Andean Countries, Brezhnev, Free Trade, Honecker, NAFTA, Obama
FARC Leader F***ed
The only new news Boz has not put up is Venezuela's reaction which is to man up along the border to protect FARC guerillas residing in his country...Oh gosh...did I say that out loud? I meant that Chavez put troops along the border to protect the sovereignty of Venezuela. Chavez is also shutting down the embassy in Bogota. Since the Colombians did not touch Venezuelan territory this strikes me as a tad hysterical, assuming that he is not associated with the FARC. Chavez is doing his saber-rattling routine to see if he can boost popularity at home - it worked for Fidel so why not him? At least that seems to be his thinking.
Labels: Chavez, Colombia, FARC, Raul Reyes, Venezuela