William Luers, Thomas Pickering and Jim Walsh have a piece in the New York Review of Books on how to deal with Iran's nuclear ambitions. Truthfully I had only heard of Pickering before, but then again I'm a dolt so what do I know? Some rather blah stuff in the piece - the usual "let's talk to Iran because it is the only thing that works" b.s. I'm saying it is not true, it's just not very new or interesting. It takes a bit but the three finally get down to their solution for the nuke impasse - multilateral program:
As a solution to the nuclear dispute, the US and its allies should propose turning Iran's national enrichment efforts into a multinational program. Under this approach, the Iranian government would agree to allow two or more additional governments (for example, France and Germany) to participate in the management and operation of those activities within Iran. In exchange, Iran would be able to jointly own and operate an enrichment facility without facing international sanctions. Resolving the nuclear issue would, in turn, make it possible for Iran to enjoy a variety of other benefits such as membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), increased trade with Europe, access to badly needed equipment for its aviation and energy industries, and perhaps normalized relations with the United States.
They then flesh it out a bit:
Such an arrangement could take many different forms, but any version of it would likely be subject to the following conditions:
- Iran would be prohibited from producing either highly enriched uranium or reprocessed plutonium. This is the most important principle in the proposal. If Iran cannot produce or acquire highly enriched uranium, it cannot build a nuclear weapon. If Iran's enrichment program is turned into a multilateral project, it makes it extremely difficult for Iran to produce highly enriched uranium. Any attempt to do so, even secretly, would carry the risk of discovery by the international management team and the staff at the facility; the high probability of getting caught will likely deter Iran from trying to do so in the first place.
- No work on nuclear fuel, including research and development, could be conducted in Iran outside the multilateral arrangement. In addition, no institution, personnel, or facility associated with the Iranian military would be allowed to participate in the production of nuclear fuel or other nuclear activities. Neither of the two kinds of materials used to make a weapon—highly enriched uranium and reprocessed plutonium—would be produced, only uranium enriched to low levels that could be used in nuclear power plants.
- Iran would fully implement the Additional Protocol of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which requires member nations to make their nuclear facilities subject to snap inspections, environmental sampling, and more comprehensive reporting requirements. Iran has already offered to go beyond the current safeguards of nuclear processes it adheres to, and it should be held to that offer. Inherent in any multilateral arrangement for Iran's nuclear program is a requirement for greater transparency, since Iran's foreign partners will need full access to records and personnel to carry out their management responsibilities.
- Iran would commit itself to a program only of light water reactors (LWRs), which require uranium fuel enriched only to low levels and which, compared with other types of reactors, produce relatively small amounts of plutonium in the nuclear waste generated. This is a reasonable demand since the LWR is the de facto international standard.
They are not blind to potential pitfalls:
For all its potential benefits, an attempt to bring Iran's nuclear program under multilateral control also carries risks. It raises a large and complex set of financial, legal, and technical issues. How can a multilateral scheme be reconciled with existing UN sanctions resolutions and national sanctions laws? How would the multinational "owners" and their management team decide policy and resolve internal disagreements?
These are not trivial issues. Still, the main objection to the multilateral approach has
traditionally been that it increases the risk of proliferation. According to this argument, Iran's capacities to build nuclear weapons could improve under a multilateral arrangement because of (a) the transfer of technical knowledge to Iranian managers and workers; (b) the potential diversion of nuclear materials or technology from the multilateral facility to a clandestine, parallel program; and (c) the possibility that Iran could cancel the program by renationalizing it and expelling the multilateral partners.
On the first issue, it seems fair to assume that Iranian technicians would, in fact, obtain technical knowledge that they did not previously possess by working with their international colleagues. What they would learn, whether the acquired knowledge would prove decisive, or whether they would have learned it on their own anyway is unclear.
On the second issue, diversion of material or technology to a clandestine program, it
is worth remembering that even with routine safeguards, diversion is extremely difficult. In practice, the IAEA has been very good at accounting for nuclear material, and Iran would have to be willing to take a large risk of detection to engage in diversion. Given the enhanced transparency of a multilateral arrangement and the constant presence in Iran of foreign monitors that such a plan would require, the risk of detection would be even higher. Indeed, experience during the nuclear age strongly suggests that governments are less likely to attempt diversion or to defeat safeguards when there is an active verification effort within a country. (In general, proliferators prefer to wait until the inspectors have gone home.)
The third concern, cancellation of a multilateral program, is possible but would doubtless prove extremely costly to Iran. Iran could not jettison the program without risking a possible military response and other punishments from the US and its international partners.
So in other words Iran won't abrogate the agreement because the costs would be too high? Seriously, what would these costs be? A possible military response? There hasn't been one yet, what could prompt the Security Council to seek it? Any bets on Russia and China approving that? Punishment from the US and "its international partners?" I suppose they are talking about the EUnuchs. What more can they be willing to do that they haven't done?
Anyway Chuck Hagel thinks it's brilliant Don't get me wrong I like Chuck but he is becoming a total media whore.
